Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an employee discovers that members of his or her organization have been engaging in securities law violations. If the employee disapproves of the misconduct, he or she will be placed in an awkward position. On the one hand, the employee will want to report the illegal activity to someone in a position of sufficient authority to put a stop to it. On the other hand, the employee may be reluctant to report the misconduct as doing so could result in retaliation by those individuals who are complicit in it.
Part of the solution to this conundrum is provided by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (The "Dodd-Frank Act").
1
The Dodd-Frank Act is a financial regulatory statute conceived by the Obama Administration and enacted in 2010 which, among other things, implemented a system of rights and protections for whistleblowers of securities law violations.
2
The Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower scheme has two broad limbs. The first limb, which this article does not discuss in any detail, rewards whistleblowers whose information leads to successful enforcement action by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"), by giving them a portion of the amount collected by the SEC in monetary sanctions (in certain circumstances). 3 The second limb of the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower system, which is the subject of this article, prohibits employers from retaliating against whistleblowers ("Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime"). 4 If an employer retaliates against a whistleblower "in the terms and conditions of employment" (for example, by demoting the whistleblower or terminating the whistleblower's employment), then the whistleblower can bring federal court proceedings against the employer to enforce their rights under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. 5 If successful, the whistleblower will be 1 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2010). 2 Id. 3 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1) (West 2010). A whistleblower will not be entitled to an award if he or she was acting in a regulatory or law enforcement capacity when he or she acquired the information, or if he or she has been convicted of a criminal offense in relation to the subject matter of the whistleblowing (see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(c)(2) (West 2010)). 4 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (West 2010). 5 Id.
The aim of this article is to explain why the Second and Ninth Circuits' approach is not only unorthodox, but also incorrect as a matter of both law and policy, and that the Supreme Court should therefore reject it and adopt the Fifth Circuit's interpretation instead. This article proceeds as follows. First, Section II sets out the competing interpretations and the reasons provided by the various circuit courts in support of them. Next, Section III critiques the Second and Ninth Circuits' statutory interpretation. This analysis will focus on the proper application of two recent Supreme Court decisions which held that a statutory word or term can have multiple and inconsistent meanings within the same piece of legislation. Finally, Section IV concludes the article by analyzing the two main policy arguments supporting the Second and Ninth Circuits' interpretation. 6 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (West 2010). 7 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2010). 8 
II. "WHISTLEBLOWER": TWO COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS
A circuit split has arisen out of an apparent inconsistency between two provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act: its statutory definition of "whistleblower," and the types of conduct that the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime states that it applies to. Starting first with the definition of "whistleblower," the DoddFrank Act explicitly defines this term as: "any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC], 9 in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the [SEC] ." 10 Viewed in isolation, the effect of this definition appears to be clear-to qualify for protection from the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, an individual must report a securities law violation directly to the SEC, and in the manner dictated by the SEC.
Next, the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime prohibits employers from retaliating against whistleblowers in response to three categories of conduct: The source of the circuit split is the third category of conduct in the quoted passage above, which will henceforth be referred to as "subdivision (iii)." While subdivisions (i) and (ii) fall in line with the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower definition, by referring to individuals who provide information to the SEC, several of the types of conduct described in subdivision (iii) involve disclosures to entities other than the SEC. For example, subdivision (iii) refers to "disclosures . . . protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act," a statute which, among other things, protects It therefore appears that subdivision (iii) was intended to protect such individuals. However, as employees who make this type of disclosure will not have made the disclosure to the SEC, they will not qualify as "whistleblowers," and will fall outside the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime's ambit. 13 Accordingly, a tension exists within the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. While, the Dodd-Frank Act restricts the "whistleblower" definition to include only people who have made disclosures to the SEC, subdivision (iii) then appears to attempt to extend protection to individuals who have not made such a disclosure. The circuit courts have formulated two competing solutions to this tension. The first interpretation, which has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit, reads the text of the Dodd-Frank Act literally by treating its whistleblower definition as all-defining, and necessarily restricting subdivision (iii)'s ambit ("Literal Interpretation").
14
The upshot is that individuals who do not report to the SEC are ineligible for protection from the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. The alternative interpretation, which was originally created by the SEC using its rule-making powers under the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 and which subsequently found favor in the Second and Ninth Circuits, takes a more expansive approach ("Expansive Interpretation"). The expansive interpretation views the Dodd-Frank Act's core whistleblower definition as irreconcilable with the wording of subdivision (iii). That being so, the expansive interpretation effectively redefines the word "whistleblower" in subdivision (iii) to include individuals who have not reported to the SEC, thereby expanding the breadth of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. 13 It is also worth noting that if the reported illegal activity was something other than a securities law violation, then the individual would also not fit within the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower definition, as they would not have provided "information relating to a violation of securities law." See 15 U.S.C.A. 
A. The Fifth Circuit's Literal Interpretation
The first circuit court to tackle this issue was the Fifth Circuit in the
16
Shortly after reporting suspicious activity to his supervisor, the plaintiff received a negative performance review and was asked to accept a demotion.
17
The plaintiff refused the demotion and was subsequently fired.
18
As the plaintiff had only reported the issue internally, and not to the SEC, he did not satisfy the Dodd-Frank Act's definition of "whistleblower." In response, the plaintiff argued that the Fifth Circuit should adopt the expansive interpretation.
19
The primary reason given by the plaintiff in support of this argument was that strictly applying the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower definition would effectively render subdivision (iii) insignificant, as most of the types of conduct described in subdivision (iii) involve reporting to entities other than the SEC. 20 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and adopted the literal interpretation for three primary reasons.
First, and most obviously, the expansive interpretation ignores the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower definition. In doing so, the Expansive Interpretation violates two core canons of statutory interpretation: specifically, that the courts should "give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision Congress used," 21 and must "interpret provisions of a statute in a manner that renders them compatible, not contradictory." 22 Secondly, and in response to the plaintiff's submission that the literal interpretation renders subdivision (iii) insignificant, the Fifth Circuit held that subdivision (iii) does in fact have a role to play under the literal interpretation. Specifically, subdivision (iii) will apply where an individual engages in a type of reporting described in subdivision (iii), and also discloses the problem to the SEC, but the employer only takes retributory For example, suppose that an employee reports a securities law violation to both the employer's CEO (a type of disclosure protected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and therefore canvassed by subdivision (iii)), 24 and to the SEC. In response, the employer, who is unaware that the employee reported the issue to the SEC, fires the employee. In these circumstances the employer retaliated against the employee's internal report, not against the employee's report to the SEC (as it is not possible to retaliate against something of which you are unaware). Accordingly, subdivisions (i) and (iii) of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, which prohibit employers from retaliating against employees for providing information to the SEC, 25 or assisting an SEC investigation, 26 will not apply. Instead, the employee will be protected by subdivision (iii). Therefore, subdivision (iii) serves a real and valuable function by protecting the employee from types of retaliation not covered by the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.
27
The third and final reason given by the Fifth Circuit for rejecting the expansive interpretation was that it effectively renders the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's retaliation provisions redundant in a securities law setting. 28 As Subdivision (iii) includes "disclosures required or protected by the SarbanesOxley Act," under the expansive interpretation any individual who makes a securities law violation disclosure covered by that statute will automatically receive protection from the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.
29
The Fifth Circuit opined that while there is a great deal of overlap between the whistleblower schemes set out in the Dodd-Frank Act and the SarbanesOxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime's protections are consistently superior. 27 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627-29. 28 720 F.3d at 626. 29 Id. 30 For example, the Dodd-Frank regime allows for the whistleblower to receive twice the amount of any pay lost due to the retaliation, whereas the Sarbanes-Oxley regime only allows recovery of the back pay, and the Dodd-Frank regime has longer limitation periods than the Sarbanes-Oxley regime. subject to a longer limitation period, 31 and are eligible for a larger back pay award, 32 than claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower scheme. Accordingly, individuals who qualify for protection under the SarbanesOxley Act, and by implication are also entitled to protection from subdivision (iii), would consistently bring their legal claims under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime rather than invoke their Sarbanes-Oxley rights.
33

B. The Second and Ninth Circuits' Expansive Interpretation
Two years after Asadi was decided, the same issue was brought before the Second Circuit in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC ("Berman").
34
Rather than following the lead of the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit created a circuit split by ruling that reporting to the SEC is not a prerequisite to receiving protection from the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.
35
More recently, in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc., 36 the Ninth Circuit also endorsed the expansive interpretation, albeit the methodology it applied to reach that outcome was slightly different from that used by the Second Circuit. In short, while both Circuits began by rejecting Asadi, the Second Circuit concluded its judgment by declining to interpret subdivision (iii) itself and applying Chevron deference to the SEC's rule instead.
37
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, did engage in a process of substantively interpreting subdivision (iii), a process which led to the same outcome as that reached by the SEC and the Second Circuit. 38 Nonetheless, as will be seen, the differences between 31 The limitation period for whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act expires 180 days after the date of the violation, or 180 days after the date on which the whistleblower becomes aware of the violation. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2012). Depending on the circumstances, the limitation period for claims under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime can range from three to ten years. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
32 Claimants under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime are eligible for an award equivalent to twice the amount of back pay owing. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78-6(h)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). However, a claimant under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may only receive the exact amount of back pay owing with interest. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(c)(2)(B) (2012). 33 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628-29. 34 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015). 35 Id. 36 Somers v. Digital Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 37 Berman, 801 F.3d at 157. 38 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050. However, the Ninth Circuit did note at 1051 that if it had been unable to resolve the ambiguity in the statute itself then it would have reached the same overall result by deferring to the SEC's interpretation.
the Second and Ninth Circuit's judgments are ultimately not as great as they first appear, with each court largely endorsing the same arguments in favor of the expansive interpretation, and against the literal interpretation.
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits began by conceding that there is no "absolute conflict" between the statutory whistleblower definition and subdivision (iii), as they can be reconciled in the manner envisaged in Asadi.
39
However, the two circuit courts asserted that the scope of subdivision (iii), under the literal interpretation, is significantly narrower than the Fifth Circuit had acknowledged. 40 There are two reasons for this. First, and more practically, an individual deciding whether to disclose wrongdoing to the SEC at the same time he or she reports it internally may be reluctant to do so as: "[he or she] will surely feel that reporting only to their employer offers the prospect of having the wrongdoing ended, with little chance of retaliation, whereas reporting to a government agency creates a substantial risk of retaliation." 41 Secondly, and more fundamentally, two types of reporting described in subdivision (iii) relate to individuals who are unable legally to disclose an issue to the SEC at the same time they disclose it internally: auditors and attorneys. In the case of auditors, Chapter 2B of Title 15 requires auditors of securities issuers to report any illegal activity they discover to the issuer's management, 42 and prohibits auditors from reporting to the SEC until the issuer has had the opportunity to take remedial action (and has failed to do so). 43 The upshot is that auditors are essentially left unprotected by subdivision (iii) under the literal interpretation, as in most cases, the issuer will retaliate before it becomes apparent to the auditor that remedial action has not occurred. 44 With respect to attorneys, the cumulative effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC's Standards of Professional Conduct is that an issuer's attorney who discovers a material violation of securities law must first report it to the issuer's chief legal counsel or CEO. 45 If the chief legal counsel or CEO does not respond appropriately, then the attorney must report 39 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150. 40 Id. at 151; Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 41 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. See also Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049-50. 42 the issue to the issuer's audit committee or board of directors. 46 Only after this has occurred can the attorney then report the violation to the SEC, and even then only in "limited instances," 47 specifically where doing so will rectify a serious violation of securities law that occurred through the use of the attorney's services, or will prevent the issuer from committing perjury or a serious violation of securities law. 48 Again, the consequence is that attorneys receive little to no protection from subdivision (iii) under the literal interpretation. 49 After finding that the literal interpretation narrows subdivision (iii) to a greater extent than recognized in Asadi, the Second and Ninth Circuits turned to the question of whether the expansive interpretation is correct.
50
It was at this stage that the two circuit courts diverged to some extent. Starting first with the Second Circuit, rather than deliver a judicial interpretation of subdivision (iii), the Court held that the tension between this provision and the core whistleblower definition in the statute created a sufficient ambiguity to warrant the granting of Chevron deference to the SEC's interpretation. 51 The Second Circuit did note, though, that if ever required to interpret subdivision (iii) itself, it "might well favor" the expansive interpretation, as it thought it was "doubtful" that Congress intended subdivision (iii) to have the "extremely limited scope" that it would have under the literal interpretation.
52
At the same time, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it was difficult to know what Congress's intentions were when it created subdivision (iii), as the provision was inserted into the Dodd-Frank Act at a late stage in the legislative process, and was not accompanied by any congressional guidance as to its purpose. 53 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not shy away from stamping subdivision (iii) with its own interpretation, albeit it noted that if it had not felt able to do so it would have nonetheless granted Chevron deference to the 46 Id. 47 While the Ninth Circuit conceded that the legislative history of the provision reveals nothing about its purpose, it found that the language of the provision itself sufficiently "illuminates congressional intent."
55
As far as the Ninth Circuit was concerned, Congress's inclusion in subdivision (iii) of types of reporting that are impossible to perform, simultaneously with a report to the SEC, demonstrated that it did not intend for subdivision (iii) to be constrained by the statutory "whistleblower" definition.
56
In comparison, and for the same reasons articulated by the Second Circuit, excluding from the protection of subdivision (iii) those people who had not made a report to the SEC, would narrow the provision "to the point of absurdity." 57 Furthermore, and in response to one of the Fifth Circuit's primary critiques of the expansive interpretation, the Ninth Circuit denied that the expansive interpretation rendered the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower provisions redundant.
58
On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit considered that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower regime had several unique features which meant that some whistleblowers would find it more attractive than the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.
59
For example, while the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime only compensates whistleblowers for lost wages, the Sarbanes Oxley Act allows for special damages to compensate for other types of injuries, such as emotional distress. 60 Additionally, while a claim brought under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime must be prosecuted by the whistleblower personally in a Federal Court, a whistleblower's claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be dealt with through an administrative review by the Secretary of Labor.
61
This procedure spares the whistleblower 54 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050-51. 55 Id. at 1049. 56 To be clear, the expansive interpretation does not appear to negate the requirement that the report was about a securities law violation, rather than other types of illegal conduct. 57 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 58 Id. 59 Id. 1)(B) . As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, though, a whistleblower who would prefer to have their claim dealt with through the courts would consider this to be a negative attribute of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower scheme. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629. much of the stress and financial risk associated with court litigation. 62 Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, rather than usurping the SarbanesOxley Act, the expansive interpretation merely increases the number of legal avenues available for whistleblowers to choose from. 63 
III. IS THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION CORRECT AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION?
This article will now consider the merits of the expansive approach as a matter of statutory interpretation. The article's analysis will focus on the reasons cited by the Second and Ninth Circuits in defense of the expansive interpretation, and in opposition to the literal interpretation. This critique is relevant to both the question of whether the Second Circuit should have deemed the SEC's interpretation to be reasonable (and therefore entitled to Chevron deference), and the question of whether the Ninth Circuit should have directly endorsed the expansive interpretation itself.
The obvious issue with the expansive interpretation is that it creates two distinct definitions of the term "whistleblower," thereby rendering the DoddFrank Act internally inconsistent. While the definitions section of the DoddFrank Act states that one of the primary defining characteristics of a "whistleblower" is that he or she made a disclosure to the SEC, 64 the expansive interpretation does not require an individual to have reported to the SEC to qualify as a subdivision (iii) "whistleblower." This is contrary to the fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that words should have consistent meanings throughout the same statute. 65 In defense of this incongruity, the Second and Ninth Circuits cited the Supreme Court decision of King v. Burwell ("King"), 66 which is authority for the proposition that a term of art can have different meanings in different parts of the same statute. 
A. Supreme Court Authority
The key part of King relied on by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the Supreme Court's statement that: "the presumption of consistent usage readily yields to context, and a statutory term may mean different things in different places . . . This is particularly true when, as here, the Act is far from a chef d'oeuvre [a masterpiece] of legislative draftsmanship." 68 In support of that statement, the Supreme Court in King, in turn, referred to its prior declaration in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency ("Utility Air"), where the court explained that:
One ordinarily assumes that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. . . . [But] the presumption of consistent usage readily yields to context, and a statutory term-even one defined in the statute-may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies. 69 Although the principle set down in King and Utility Air-that the meaning of a term can "shapeshift" across a statute-is controversial, 70 the Second and Ninth Courts can hardly be criticized for attempting to follow principles laid down by the Supreme Court. The real issue with the expansive interpretation, however, is not that it relies on a controversial Supreme Court principle, but rather that it misapplies that principle. Specifically, the expansive interpretation sets too low a threshold for the circumstances in which the courts can apply the principle from King and Utility Air. Properly understood, King and Utility Air should be treated as supporting the legal principle that the courts may only depart from the plain meaning of statutory language, and adopt an internally inconsistent interpretation where the statutory context clearly and unequivocally requires this.
71
In other words, a 68 That this is the case should be apparent not only from looking at how the Supreme Court applied its own principle in King and Utility Air, but also from its warning that: "Reliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is a subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself." 73 With that warning in mind, this article will now briefly sketch out the details of the Supreme Court's treatment of the legislation at issue in King and Utility Air.
74
The purpose of this analysis is to understand the types of circumstances in which the Supreme Court considered it appropriate to adopt a statutory interpretation that is inconsistent with the language of the statute and other provisions within it. This analysis will demonstrate that the expansive interpretation is, ironically, the result of the Second and Ninth Circuits taking the Supreme Court's statement in King at face value, rather than assessing it against the context in which it was made. 
77
Although the black letter wording of the phrase appeared to only encapsulate exchanges established by State governments, the Supreme Court held that the Affordable Care Act's tax credit provisions do apply to federal 72 Id. 73 exchanges.
78
This was because the entire purpose of the Affordable Care Act is to avoid economic "death spirals" in the health insurance market-a phenomenon whereby the number of people purchasing insurance decreases, resulting in higher premiums, leading to further decreases in the number of people purchasing insurance, and so on. 79 The Affordable Care Act sought to avoid death spirals by both making health insurance more affordable (through granting tax credits to people who purchase health insurance on an "Exchange") and making it compulsory for individuals to purchase health insurance, unless the cost of insurance would exceed 8% of the individual's income, as calculated after applying their tax credit.
80
This objective was explicitly articulated in the text of the Affordable Care Act. 81 Furthermore, the Supreme Court had the benefit of a brief that the congressmen involved in the drafting of the statute had filed as aimici curiae; 82 and the Court also deduced how the statute was intended to operate from the fact that it was based on a health insurance regime implemented in Massachusetts. 83 Taking into account this purpose, the Supreme Court concluded that interpreting the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [42 USC
§ 18031]," so that it excludes federal exchanges, would mean that many residents of states with a federal rather than state exchange would not receive tax credits.
84
This would reduce the total number of people obligated to purchase health insurance in these states, and without the tax credits many residents' incomes would be low enough to place the cost of health insurance above the 8% threshold.
85
Health insurance would then become more expensive, which would in turn place more residents above the 8% threshold.
86
The end result would be the very type of death spiral Congress had sought to avoid by passing the Affordable Care Act with health insurance premiums rising by as much as 47%, and enrollments decreasing by as much 78 In order to avoid this outcome, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "an Exchange established by the State" in the Affordable Health Care Act's tax credit provision included both state and federal exchanges.
88
This interpretation departed significantly from the natural meaning of the statutory wording.
89
In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the statutory phrase at issue appeared in several segments of the Affordable Care Act, not just the tax credit provision. 90 Therefore, the effect of the Court's decision would be that those other usages of the phrase also constitute references to federal exchanges. The Court's response, which was later invoked by the Ninth Circuit in Somers, is that this is not necessarily the case, as the Court had previously set down the principle in Utility Air that a term of art can have different meanings in different parts of the same statute. 91 However, the Court did not issue a definitive ruling on the question of whether its interpretation of the phrase at issue was limited solely to the phrase's usage in the tax credit provision, as it was not necessary to do so to dispose of the case. 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency
Turning to Utility Air, that case was concerned with the meaning of the term "air pollutant" in the Clean Air Act, which had a statutory definition of: "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological [or] radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air."
93
The Supreme Court previously held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), has authority to regulate new motor vehicles under Title II of the Clean Air Act, as motor vehicles emit greenhouse gases, which qualify as "air pollutants." 94 Following the Massachusetts decision, the EPA formed 87 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492-94. 88 Id. at 2494. 89 Id. at 2495. 90 Id. at 2498-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 91 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494. 92 Id. at 2493 n. However, the Court eschewed this approach. Instead, the Court performed a robust analysis of whether it was appropriate to extend the Massachusetts interpretation to Title V and the PSD program.
98
In construing the term "air pollutants" within the context of Title V and the PSD program the Court focused primarily on the consequences of the EPA's interpretation.
99
The conclusion reached was that these consequences would be dire. 100 Specifically, the Court found that adopting the EPA's proposed interpretation would cause the number of PSD program permit applications per annum to increase from 800 to 82,000, and the number of annual Title V permit applications to increase from 15,000 to 6.1 billion.
101
This would impose significant administrative burdens on the EPA, as the PSD program permit application procedure was "complicated, resource-intensive, timeconsuming and sometimes contentious," 102 while the Title V application procedure was "finely crafted for thousands, not millions of sources." 103 For example, under both the PSD program and Title V, it is necessary to hold a public hearing on each application. This would in turn most likely cause the PSD program's administrative costs to increase from $12 million to over $1.5 billion, while Title V administrative costs would increase from $62 million to $21 billion. 104 Furthermore, most of the additional entities that would be pulled under the umbrellas of Title V and the PSD program would be small- In light of this context, the Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Title V and the PSD program, the term "air pollutant" excludes greenhouse gases. 106 The Court acknowledged that as it had previously declared under Title II of the Clean Air Act, "air pollutants" included greenhouse gases. 107 The effect of its decision was that the meaning of this term changes from section to section of the Clean Air Act. However, in its defense, the Supreme Court laid down the rule that it would later cite in King: "a statutory termeven one defined in the statute-may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies." 108 
Reassessing the Expansive Interpretation's Application of King v. Burwell
The above examination of King and Utility Air demonstrates how different the legislative provisions at issue in those cases were from subdivision (iii), and why those decisions therefore do not support the expansive interpretation. Specifically, there are two crucial differences between King and Utility Air on one hand, and subdivision (iii) on the other: the existence of evidence of actual and imputed congressional intent. 109 Starting with actual intent, as outlined above, in King the Supreme Court had access to substantial information as to Congress's actual intentions when it created the statutory provision at issue.
110
This information gave the Court the confidence to interpret the statutory provisions at issue in a manner that departed from the natural meaning of the language used. legislative process, and was not accompanied by any explanation of its purpose. Accordingly, and as the Second and Ninth Circuits acknowledged, no extrinsic evidence whatsoever exists as to what Congress hoped to achieve with subdivision (iii).
112 Therefore, it is not possible to justify the expansive interpretation, or any interpretation for that matter, by reference to what Congress's actual intentions were when enacting subdivision (iii).
In considering imputed intent, a factor supporting the interpretations the Supreme Court adopted in King and Utility Air, was that the consequences of adhering to the plain meanings of the statutory language would be so unpalatable that it could be inferred that Congress had not intended those results. In King the evidence before the Court demonstrated that adopting a literal interpretation of the statutory provision at issue would have caused health insurance costs to skyrocket and enrolments to nose-dive.
113
In Utility Air, adopting a literal interpretation would have brought billions of smallscale sources of greenhouse gases into the domain of the Clean Air Act and, in turn, imposed tens of billions of dollars in costs on the EPA and third parties. 114 Therefore, in the absence of an explicit statement of Congress's objective, it could be inferred that Congress had not intended these extreme outcomes.
In comparison, while the consequences of adopting the literal interpretation of subdivision (iii) may be viewed as suboptimal by some, those consequences could hardly be described as so disastrous that Congress cannot possibly have intended them. Although the literal interpretation grants the protection of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime to a smaller class of individuals than the expansive interpretation, most of those excluded will nonetheless continue to receive protection from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower protection regime, usually be left without recourse.
117
In fact, and as noted above, 118 in many ways the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower protections are superior to the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, and one would expect that many whistleblowers may prefer the former over the latter if given a choice.
For example, whistleblowers who suffered significant emotional distress due to the retaliatory conduct will be more likely to be made whole by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower provisions than the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. 119 Similarly, many whistleblowers may balk at the prospect of litigating their case under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime in a federal court, and instead prefer the administrative procedure set out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
120
That being so, it can hardly be said that the literal interpretation produces sufficiently bad outcomes that it can be inferred that Congress did not intend this result. This is an argument that the Ninth Circuit unwittingly and implicitly accepted when, as noted above, it identified that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower provisions are in many ways superior to the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. 121 Ironically, in its attempt to rebut the argument that the Expansive Interpretation renders the SarbanesOxley Act's whistleblower protections redundant, the Ninth Circuit has served only to highlight the extent to which the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime is distinct from the statutory regimes at issue in King and Utility Air.
122
B. Auditors and Attorneys
Of course, defenders of the expansive interpretation would disagree that the negative consequences of the literal interpretation are as trivial as suggested above. In fact, in support of their predictions of adverse consequences, the Second and Ninth Circuits have identified two key casualties of the literal interpretation: auditors and attorneys. 123 As discussed 117 Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting retaliatory dismissal lose their primary source of income, and may also suffer damage to their personal well-being. 165 Auditors and external counsel on the other hand, usually have a portfolio of clients, meaning that the financial and psychological consequences of retaliation are comparatively minor.
The second distinction is the presence, or lack thereof, of professional obligations. As employees who report illegal activity within their organization are essentially going beyond the call of duty, it is therefore fair and just that the law protects them from retaliation. In comparison, auditors and attorneys who engage in whistleblowing are merely fulfilling the obligations they voluntarily undertook when they entered their professions. By definition, an auditor's role is to discover and report issues within their clients' businesses. There therefore seems to be less need to create incentives for auditors to participate in whistleblowing as it is a core component of the career they have chosen to pursue. Similarly, to join the legal profession, and enjoy the various privileges attached to it, an individual must agree to various quasi-whistleblower obligations. The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct expect attorneys employed or retained by a corporation to internally report illegal activity being performed, or about to be performed, by members of that organization. 166 Attorneys are also expected to make disclosures necessary to prevent clients from committing crimes likely to result in substantial financial harm, 167 or mitigate the financial harm caused by crimes their clients committed through the use of the attorneys' services. 168 These obligations are largely similar to those imposed on issuers' attorneys by the SEC's Standards of Professional Conduct. 169 That being said, there is little reason to demand that attorneys receive special protections for complying with SEC reporting obligations that are in substance, the same as the ethical obligations they undertook when they entered the legal profession. It is also hard to see why when attorneys who report other types of illegal conduct performed by their clients are not protected.
V. CONCLUSION
The story of subdivision (iii)'s creation and interpretation is ultimately a tale of oversight. When drafting subdivision (iii) Congress erred by failing to understand the confusion that its casual use of the term "whistleblower" would cause. But one error does not justify another, and in their haste to formulate an interpretation that they considered palatable the Second and Ninth Circuits have made several oversights of their own. If the Second and Ninth Circuits had properly assessed the full scope of the statutory regime at issue, as well as the Supreme Court authority they invoked, then perhaps they would have reached different conclusions. As noted above, the Circuit Split should soon come to an end when the Supreme Court rules on the appeal of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Somers. Unless defenders of the expansive interpretation can provide the Supreme Court with fresh and persuasive reasons in favor of this approach, then the Supreme Court should overturn the Ninth Circuit's decision and adopt the literal interpretation instead.
